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I. INTRODUCTION
Can we measure the quality of a judge’s past performance? Should
the President weigh this factor in making Supreme Court appointments?1 I will argue that the answer to both questions is the same:
“Yes, but with significant qualifications.” Yes, we do have some indices for assessing judicial performance—but those measures are rough
and incomplete. Yes, the President should consider past judicial performance and its objective indicators—but only to a limited degree.
These comments are prompted by two important recent articles by
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati.2 They make a more ambitious claim:
that we can measure judicial quality well enough to make it the predominant element in Supreme Court appointments. In their initial
article, they proposed a tournament, an objective contest among federal appellate judges in which the prize is a Supreme Court appointment.3 In their follow-up article, they run an initial tournament
using recent data about federal appellate decisions.4 They hedge
their conclusions about “who is the fairest in the land,” but the clear

* Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. In my view, the Senate is probably entitled to consider the same factors as the
President in determining whether the nomination is suitable. But the role of the Senate in
judicial confirmations is controversial and beyond the scope of this Essay.
2. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking].
3. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 2.
4. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2.
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import seems to be that Richard Posner should be the next Supreme
Court appointment.5
While the tournament idea is intriguing, it is far too ambitious. In
my view, a conscientious President probably would not choose Justices on the basis of such a tournament, partly because we cannot
measure professional merit well enough and partly because professional merit is not the only factor that the President should find relevant. Nevertheless, Choi and Gulati have made a valuable contribution by showing how objective measures of quality can improve the
appointments process. Simply making the tournament data available
on a regular basis through a reliable information source could help
temper partisan claims and provide guidance for the public. Moreover, the data in their follow-up article raises tantalizing questions
about the appellate process and, in particular, about the dynamics of
judicial influence. Those questions would be well worth pursuing
even if the results had nothing to tell us about how to appoint Justices.
II. INDICATORS OF JUDICIAL QUALITY
Supreme Court Justices engage in four major tasks: (1) they vote
on which cases to accept, (2) they vote on the outcomes of cases, (3)
they write majority opinions, and (4) they write dissents and concurrences.6 By contrast, federal appellate judges only engage in two of
these tasks.7 Federal appellate judges rarely write separate opinions,
so the fourth factor is less significant in assessing their performance.
Also, nearly all appeals at the circuit level are mandatory, which
makes the first factor less significant. This leaves two major tasks for
federal circuit judges: voting on the merits and writing opinions. How
well a judge performs these tasks on a lower court presumably has
some predictive value about potential performance on the Supreme
Court.8 Choi and Gulati attempt to measure circuit judges’ performance of these tasks along three dimensions: productivity, quality of
opinion writing, and independence.9 Of these, as we will see, the at5. Id. at 74, 113 tbl.H. I know a number of academics who agree—including some
who are liberals or skeptics about Posner’s specialty, law and economics—but I do not
know of anyone who thinks the prospect is likely.
6. Justices also engage in other tasks, such as considering stay orders or approving
changes in federal procedural rules, but these seem less central to the role.
7. The current norm is for Presidents to nominate circuit judges to the Supreme
Court. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003); see also Choi &
Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 40. Whether this norm is desirable is outside
the scope of this Essay.
8. How much predictive value is another question, which we will consider in Part IV,
infra.
9. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 33, 42.
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tempt to measure opinion quality via citation rates is probably the
most successful.
A. Productivity
One of the stated purposes of the tournament is to encourage
judges to work harder as they compete for higher rankings and Supreme Court nominations.10 One of the indices of judicial performance, consequently, is productivity. Since circuit judges have discretion over which of their opinions are published, Choi and Gulati argue that judges with a higher number of published opinions are investing more time and effort in polishing opinions for publication.
This is quite plausible, but there are alternative explanations for
high publication rates that make these rates a weak indicator of effort.
One possible explanation for a high publication rate could be that
a judge has trouble identifying which cases are important enough to
serve as precedents and therefore deserve published opinions. Such
an inability would be a handicap in a Supreme Court Justice. One of
the Justice’s tasks is to decide which cases deserve Supreme Court
review; thus a judge who cannot accurately gauge the significance of
a case is at a disadvantage.
Another possible explanation is self-centeredness. Some judges
may consider all of their output to be worthy of preservation for the
ages, simply because it is theirs. A related explanation is that a judge
may fail to appreciate the costs that publication imposes on others.
The two other members of the panel must invest additional time in
reviewing and commenting on a published opinion, and additional
published opinions increase the size of the pool of authority that lawyers must search. Productivity based on self-centeredness does not
speak well of judicial quality or recommend promotion to the Supreme Court.
An alternative explanation for high publication rates is consistent
with the idea that some judges invest more effort in perfecting their
opinions for use as precedents. Judges may vary in how important
they consider this function of opinions, and some judges may focus
more heavily on their role as generators of precedents at the expense
of their dispute settlement role. A published appellate opinion not
only provides a precedent, it resolves a specific piece of litigation. It
is important for the functioning of the legal system as a whole that
appeals be correctly decided, which means not only that the correct
rules of law are announced for the future but that the rules are relevant and correctly applied to the specific case. This may take tedious
10. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 2, at 304.
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investigation of the trial record. A judge who is willing to cut corners
on fidelity to the record can publish more opinions, and those opinions may be well regarded as precedent. Yet, that judge also decreases the ability of the legal system to respond accurately to the
facts of cases and degrades the overall performance of the system
(besides being unfair to individual litigants). Furthermore, individual
cases themselves sometimes have substantial social importance
(think of the Microsoft antitrust litigation or of redistricting challenges), so it is important for judges to invest time in scrutinizing the
record even if doing so does not increase the opinion’s precedential
value.
A final, and even simpler, explanation is that some judges need
not invest a high level of effort in order to get a high publication
count, either because they themselves are facile writers or because
they are able to recruit and motivate highly productive law clerks.
Being able to write easily, or successfully motivate clerks to do so, is
a valuable trait. It is not, however, a gauge of effort. Moreover,
judges are probably either good writers when they are appointed (or
good supervisors) or they are not; either way, providing incentives is
unlikely to make much difference.
The bottom line is that productivity may measure good judicial
traits such as effort or writing ability or bad judicial traits such as
self-centeredness or sloppy treatment of facts. Without knowing
more, we cannot be sure of what we are measuring or whether it is
something we want to encourage.
B. Citations as a Measure of Opinion Quality
Are citation counts, of any kind, a gauge of quality? In the context
of appellate judges, it seems plausible to think so. For citations to be
unrelated to quality, we would have to assume that judges are just as
likely to cite and rely on muddled or ill-reasoned opinions as on cogent and logical ones. This would indicate a serious problem with the
functioning of the federal judiciary. Presumably, judges tend to cite
cases which best support their arguments or most require distinguishing or rebuttal. Consequently, they should favor strong opinions
over weak ones in their citation practice.
Yet we should not expect citations to be a very precise measure of
quality. Too many other factors may influence how often a judge’s
opinions are cited: the “luck of the draw” (how many significant cases
are drawn by panels on which that judge sits), the author’s reputation (which may imperfectly reflect actual quality), the quality of the
judge’s law clerks in a particular year, ideological or personal affiliations (or antipathies) between judges, and just plain luck (perhaps an
opinion gets cited more often because its name is short and memora-
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ble or because the facts are striking).11 For these and other reasons, it
seems right to say that “[c]itations are at best a crude and rough
proxy for measuring influence.”12 In turn, influence may only imperfectly reflect quality.
Moreover, we may not want circuit judges to strive to maximize
their citation rates. In seeking to increase their influence, judges
may reach for broader holdings by ignoring the factual nuances of
specific cases. Or in trying to write influential opinions, they may
simply not pay much attention to the litigation record. They might
also be likely to insert unnecessary dicta or to address issues not
raised by the lawyers or addressed by the trial judge. None of these
seem to be particularly beneficial behaviors.
Although these points suggest the need for caution in relying on
citation counts, it remains true that citation counts tell us something
important about how useful opinions are to other judges. A judge
whose opinions are consistently useful to others is probably doing
something right, while a judge whose opinions are rarely cited is
probably performing badly.
C. Independence
“Knee-jerk” is not usually considered a good adjective as applied
to judges. We presumably do not want judges who always vote for the
most liberal or conservative result without considering specific legal
arguments. It is probably even worse to have judges who always vote
with members of the same political party without regard to the merits of cases. Thus, Choi and Gulati are right to include independence
as one of their measures, but their measurement of this characteristic is problematic.
Choi and Gulati measure independence by counting disagreements with other judges appointed by Presidents of the same political party.13 This does not seem to be a particularly apt measure. A
Republican-appointed judge who often votes on the opposite side
from others may be more moderate, but equally well could be an ideological extremist who is parting company with less ideological colleagues. Moreover, since we are talking about relatively small num11. Also, the citation figures do not seem to measure quality for members of the D.C.
Circuit, who tend to get fewer citations because their workload is specialized, centering on
administrative law. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 40 n.30 (recognizing that the different nature of the D.C. Circuit’s docket from that of the other circuits
might make total citations a less meaningful comparison, but including D.C. Circuit judges
in the tournament because other citation figures, such as citations to top twenty opinions
and citations by law review, might be more meaningful).
12. William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts
of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998).
13. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 63.
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bers of judges in each circuit, it is hard to control for other variables.
Some judges may have been appointed by members of the same party
but have sharp personality clashes with each other, or one may be
markedly more competent than the other. This could lead to frequent
disagreements but would not tell us much about whether a judge is
voting on a purely ideological basis.
More fundamentally, independence is not a neutral concept. What
one of us sees as an ideologue, another may see as a person of principle. Judges who vote on the basis of expediency rather than principle
may disagree frequently with their more principled colleagues. Or to
put it another way, one might view “independence” as a euphemism
for “inconsistency” and hence as an undesirable trait.
Deciding how much weight to give to independence or how to
measure it requires a normative judgment. Formalists and pragmatists may have different concepts of what kind of independence is required by judges. For the formalist, it is the ability to strictly follow a
set of rules, regardless of pressure to reach a more congenial result.
For the pragmatist, it is the ability to be open to opposing arguments, consider the implications of a decision, and reach a balanced
conclusion. These translate into very different conceptions of judicial
independence.
III. PROBING THE MEASURES OF OPINION QUALITY
Of the three basic criteria discussed in Part II—productivity, opinion quality, and independence—it is the second factor that seems
most useful in assessing judicial performance. As we have seen, productivity is an ambiguous quality, which might reflect either well or
badly on judicial performance. Independence is normatively charged
and hard to measure. Thus, the remainder of this Essay will focus
primarily on opinion quality as the measure of judicial performance.
Obviously, other highly desirable traits may not be captured by this
measure.
Opinion quality is assessed through citation counts.14 Although citation counts do seem related to the quality of judicial opinions, various different citation counts can be used and the data can be handled
in different ways. We need to know more about the processes that
generate this data before we can decide on the proper method of
measurement. Choi and Gulati have assembled some extremely interesting data, which provide a basis for a more detailed analysis.
This analysis is significant for reasons that go beyond the tournament idea. Citation practices—which opinions are cited, by whom,
and for what purpose—are a basic part of the legal system. But we
14. See id. at 48-49.
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know little about the processes involved. The data presented by Choi
and Gulati help shed some light on these broader questions.
A. Power Laws and Normal Distributions
In trying to understand the process that produces citation rates,
one of the most important clues is the shape of the statistical distribution. Different kinds of processes characteristically produce different sorts of distributions. For purposes of this Essay, we are primarily interested in two types: the normal distribution and the powerlaw distribution.
The best-known statistical distribution is the “bell curve,” or normal distribution, which is often associated with the idea of random
variation.15 Bell curves are associated with a certain type of random
process. According to a basic statistical law, “the sum of a large number of independent random variables will be approximately normally
distributed almost regardless of their individual distributions.”16
Thus, when many small factors combine to produce a result and each
factor has an element of randomness, the result is likely to be a normal distribution.
In assessing how close a distribution comes to being normal, there
are three useful parameters. The first involves the center of the distribution. For the normal curve, the median, the mean (what most
people mean by the “average”), and the mode are identical. The second parameter is skew, which measures asymmetry. A normal curve
is symmetrical rather than being stretched in one direction. The
skew parameter is zero for the normal distribution. A high skew
means that a distribution is bunched on one side and stretched out
on the other. The third parameter is called kurtosis. Kurtosis measures whether a curve is flattened out or unusually peaked, compared
with the normal distribution. The normal distribution has a kurtosis
of three.17
Apart from the normal curve, we are also interested in another
type of distribution—the power-law distribution. Complex, nonlinear
systems have a characteristic distribution of outcomes: a “high frequenc[y] of small fluctuations, punctuated by the occasional large
shift[] in system conditions.”18 Rather than following the familiar
normal distribution, outcomes in complex systems often follow what

15. See generally M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 108-15 (Dover ed. 1979)
(1965).
16. Id. at 109.
17. See id. at 63-65.
18. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933,
952 (1997).
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are called power laws19—that is, the frequency of an event is often
given by its magnitude taken to a fixed negative exponent.20
Some additional explanation of power laws may be helpful for the
non-mathematically inclined. Albert-László Barabási, a physicist
who studies complex networks, explains how power laws work. Contrasting power laws with the normal curve governing characteristics
such as human heights, he points out that a frequency distribution
“following a power law is a continuously decreasing curve, implying
that many small events coexist with a few large events.”21 For example, “[i]f the heights of an imaginary planet’s inhabitants followed a
power law distribution, most creatures would be really short. But nobody would be surprised to see occasionally a hundred-feet-tall monster walking down the street.”22 Such “outliers” are much less likely
when a normal distribution is involved. Or, in more technical terms,
“[b]ell curves have an exponentially decaying tail, which is a much
faster decrease than that displayed by a power law.”23
Caselaw can be considered a network of cases linked by citations.
Power laws seem characteristic of complicated networks. Some examples include the World Wide Web, where the number of links to a
particular site follows a power law; the number of citations to a given
physics paper; and even the number of other actors with whom a
given Hollywood star has appeared.24 On the Web, for example, about
ninety percent of a sample of two hundred million web pages are the
targets of ten or less links, while about three pages had roughly a
million other pages linking to them.25 Similarly, students of bibliometrics refer to Lotka’s law, under which productivity follows an inverse-square relationship: if one hundred scholars in a group each
publish one paper annually, then twenty-five will publish two, eleven
will publish three, six will publish four, and so forth, with a single
scholar producing ten papers.26 In other words, the number of scholars who produce N articles per year is proportionate to 1/N2. As it
turns out, Supreme Court opinions also appear to follow a power law
in terms of their frequency of citation.27
19. For an introduction to power laws, see MANFRED SCHROEDER, FRACTALS, CHAOS,
POWER LAWS: MINUTES FROM AN INFINITE PARADISE 33-38, 103-19 (1991).
20. See RICARD SOLÉ & BRIAN GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE: HOW COMPLEXITY PERVADES
BIOLOGY 201 (2000).
21. ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 67 (2002).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 68 n.1.
24. Id. at 67-69.
25. Id. at 57-58.
26. See Virgil L.P. Blake, Citation Studies—The Missing Background, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 1962 n.6 (1991) (book review) (citing Linus Ikpaahindi, An Overview of Bibliometrics: Its Measurements, Laws and Their Applications, 35 LIBRI 163, 171 (1985)).
27. Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848, 871-72 (2005).
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Several possible mechanisms might result in a power-law distribution for judicial citations. One is the superstar phenomenon.28
Suppose that judges differ in quality. The top judge’s opinions are
slightly better than everyone else’s. So when that judge has written
on an issue, her opinion is the one cited by other judges. When she
has not written on an issue but the second-best judge has done so,
the second-best judge’s opinion gets cited instead; and so forth. Small
differences in quality can translate into large differences in rankings—just as small differences in GPAs can translate into large differences in class ranks.
We can get some sense of how the superstar phenomenon works
with a simple model. Assume that the chances that a particular
judge will get to write about a particular issue is 1/a (in other words,
this is the probability that the judge will sit on the first case in the
circuit raising that issue and be assigned to write the opinion). Thus,
1/a is the proportion of issues that any particular judge can write
precedential opinions about. In this simple model, once an issue has
been decided in a given circuit, later opinions cite that as the dispositive opinion in the circuit because it binds future panels; later judges
in the circuits have no reason to do any more than cite that case.
Then the best judge will write on 1/a of the issues, and those opinions will be the exclusive citations when those issues arise, so that
judge receives a 1/a share of the cites. The second-best judge has a
1/a share of the remaining cites, or (1/a)(1 - 1/a). By the time we
get to the “(n + 1) judge,” the number of remaining cases where no
previous judge has written is (1 - 1/a)n, and so that judge gets cited
in (1/a)(1 - 1/a)n of the cases. Note that the ratio between the “n
judge” and the “(n + 1) judge” in terms of citations is constant: (1 1/a). This is a power-law distribution.29
Note that in this model, the ranking of citations perfectly replicates the ranking of quality, but the scale is distorted, since even a
tiny difference in opinion quality means that the top judge will be
cited in preference to the other judges in every case where the top
judge has written.30 The superstar effect can also appear even if there
28. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 72.
29. A fuller model would introduce some complications. Certain judges may sit on circuits where more issues of first impression arise, which would increase their chances of
hearing such cases. Similarly, by reason of seniority, some judges may be more likely to get
assigned the interesting opinions. Also, if the number of novel issues is not proportionate
to caseload, judges from smaller circuits might have an advantage because fewer judges
would be splitting up the interesting cases. Conceivably, influential judges might sometimes be cited when they merely follow existing circuit precedent, rather than making new
law. Finally, it probably is not true that a higher-ranking judge is always cited in preference to a lower-ranking one, so we might need to add some random variation.
30. For a summary of various situations that can produce a superstar distribution,
see Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Superstar
Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141, 1181-89 (2002).
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are no differences in quality between judges. If consumers tend to
cite cases in proportion to their existing popularity, with only a small
chance of citing something that has not been cited previously, the
distribution of product types will tend to something called the Yule
distribution, which is close to being an inverse-square power distribution.31
Other processes might produce a normal distribution rather than
a power-law distribution. The citation count for a given opinion
might depend on a whole series of factors, each of which varies randomly. For example, the list of factors might include:
(1) The judge’s past experience with issues in the field.
(2) The judge’s IQ.
(3) How much time the judge can devote to the particular opinion,
given other responsibilities.
(4) The quality of the lawyers in the case (it is presumably easier to
write a good opinion if the briefs are of high quality and the case
has been well litigated).
(5) Who else is on the panel and how many changes they demand.
(6) Whether the opinion is well classified by the digest systems, and
whether the judge used the right key words that will show up in
a computer search.
(7) Whether the opinion happens to be cited in the next few cases on
the issue.
If we assume that each of these and similar factors has an element of randomness, their combined effect is likely to look like a
normal distribution. On the other hand, a power-law distribution
suggests that some kind of feedback is at work. With these observations in mind, we consider the distributions of various measures of
opinion quality.
B. Invocations
We begin with invocations, that is, with the number of times the
judge is identified by name in later opinions as the author of a major-

Gulati and Sanchez explain the extreme cases using the “pure talent explanation” (where
outcomes simply reflect the enormously greater talent of certain individuals) and the “pure
randomness explanation” (where an initial lucky success is “locked in” by a cascade effect).
See id. at 1183-84.
31. See Kee H. Chung & Raymond A.K. Cox, A Stochastic Model of Superstardom: An
Application of the Yule Distribution, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 771 (1994). The Yule distribution can be approximated by 1/[(N)(N + 1)], see id. at 773, which is bounded above by (and
converges with) 1/N2. Thus the statement in the text that the Yule distribution is “close
to” an inverse-square relationship. In another model, reputation effects and search costs
can produce the superstar effect even if there are no quality differences. See Moshe Adler,
Stardom and Talent, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 208 (1985).
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ity opinion.32 As we will see, this distribution looks nothing at all like
a bell curve. In fact, it is more extreme than one would expect from a
power-law distribution.
Table 1 shows that something odd is going on with invocation
rates.
TABLE 1
FREQUENCY OF INVOCATIONS33
TOTAL INVOCATIONS

NUMBER OF JUDGES

0-9

88

10-24

8

25-49

0

50-74

0

75-99

0

100-124

1

125-149

0

150-174

0

175-199

1

(Note that what would otherwise be the first row here (0-24) is split
into two, in order to give a better sense of the shape of the distribution.) The distribution consists of two outliers (who are actually Posner and Easterbrook34) along with a large clump. The summary statistics confirm the oddness of this distribution: the kurtosis is a remarkably high 54.7 (recall that the kurtosis of a normal curve is
three).35
For purposes of comparison, imagine that the same table showed
someone’s journal of food expenses. On most days the person lives
frugally, spending less than $10 a day; on other days the person lives
more expansively, spending up to $25. But on two days out of a hundred, the person’s food expenses leap over $150. The obvious inference is that something special happened on those days: either the
person splurged at a really fancy restaurant or invited a group of
people to dinner. These were obviously not just days when the person
32. For background on invocation rates, see David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The
Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371 (1999).
33. Table 1 was constructed by collating figures from Table F of Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 104-07.
34. Posner had 176 invocations and Easterbrook had 103 during the time span studied by Choi and Gulati. Id.
35. Id. at 107.
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felt a little hungrier and ordered extra food. Similarly, something
special seems to be happening with the invocation rates for Posner
and Easterbrook.
One possibility is that Posner and Easterbrook are simply judges
of an entirely different caliber than their fellows, like two NBA players who have wandered into a lawyers’ after-work basketball game.
While they may well be exceptionally good judges, however, it seems
unlikely that differences in ability level can account for the magnitude of the difference in invocation rates. The third-highest-ranking
judge is Guido Calabresi, with twenty-three invocations.36 Posner and
Easterbrook are undoubtedly very bright, but are they five times as
bright as Calabresi, not to mention the other eminent judges on the
list?
Another possibility is the superstar phenomenon—judges invoke
only the very best names, given a choice, so a judge who is just a little better than his fellows will get disproportionately more invocations. Without a good model of how reputations develop, it is hard to
test this explanation. We can get some sense of its plausibility by assuming that a judge’s prestige tracks the number of legal issues on
which a judge has written the leading opinion. Under the basic superstar model, this is simply equal to the number of cases on which a
judge is cited, since courts are presumed to cite only the leading
(“best”) opinion. But the distribution of invocations does not fit with
this explanation. The problem is that no matter how good Easterbrook and Posner are, they first have to sit on a case where an issue
is presented in order to write the leading opinions on that issue.
There must be a great many legal issues that, for one reason or another, have not been the subjects of opinions by Easterbrook or Posner: either they did not happen to be on a panel on which these issues were raised or someone else wrote the opinion. In these other
cases, the superstar phenomenon should lead to large numbers of citations of leading opinions by the third- or fourth-best judges on issues that never reached Posner and Easterbrook. Hence these second-tier judges should have written almost as many leading opinions
as Posner and Easterbrook, and their invocation rates should not be
drastically lower. But this is not what we see in the data.
Recall that, in the basic model, the superstar effect produces a
constant ratio between citations as we move one rank in the ratings.
But for invocations, the ratio between judges 1 and 2 is 103/176, or
0.58; the ratio between judges 2 and 3 is 23/103, or 0.22; and the ra-

36. Id. at 104 tbl.F.
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tio between judges 3 and 4 is 19/23, or 0.82.37 Moreover, the first two
ratios are hard to account for on the basis of the superstar effect.
Consider the 0.58 ratio between the first and second judges. In the
basic superstar model,38 the ratio between judges who adjoin in the
rank order is (1 - 1/a), and if we set this equal to 0.58, we get 1/a =
0.42. (Remember that 1/a is the likelihood that a judge will write the
controlling circuit opinion on the issue.) But this seems implausibly
high—it would require that the top judge happen to sit on the panel
(and get assigned the opinion) in 42% of the cases raising issues of
first impression in the circuit.39 For similar reasons, the 0.22 ratio
between judges 2 and 3 is even harder to square with the superstar
model.40
Invocations reflect reputations rather than raw citation figures,
but it is hard to see why the falloff between reputations should be so
steep as we move from the judge who is considered to be the best in
the country to the second-best and then to the third-best judge. We
cannot exclude this possibility, however, without a better theory of
how judicial quality is translated into reputations.
Another plausible possibility is that Easterbrook’s and Posner’s
names are invoked for reasons other than general judicial reputation.
Perhaps they are invoked in cases involving their special area of expertise: economic analysis.41 It would be entirely understandable that
these two judges should be the dominant judicial figures on economics issues.

37. The numbers used to calculate these ratios are the total invocations to the top
four judges—Posner, Easterbrook, Calabresi, and Wilkinson, respectively—as reported by
Choi and Gulati. Id.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
39. Consider a court comprised of N members. What are the odds that a given judge
will not be on a panel? When we pick the first judge on the panel, the odds are (N - 1)/N of
getting someone other than the specified judge. Now there are only (N - 1) judges left in the
pool, so the odds of missing the specified judge the second time are (N - 2)/(N - 1). Similarly, the odds of missing the specified judge a third time are (N - 3)/(N - 2). If we multiply
these together and simplify, everything cancels out except (N - 3)/N, so the chances of
missing the specified judge all three times is (1 - 3/N). Hence, the judge will be on 3/N of
the panels. But Posner is from the Seventh Circuit, and we know that there were ten
judges from that circuit in the tournament, see Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra
note 2, at 41 tbl.1, and this does not include post-1998 appointments, senior judges, or
judges sitting by designation, all of whom serve on panels. Even for N = 10, we would get
only a 30% chance of serving on a particular panel, so it is unlikely that Posner would have
the opportunity to sit on panels hearing 42% of the cases that raise issues of first impression.
40. With (1 - 1/a) equal to 0.22, 1/a = 0.78. Following up the reasoning of the previous footnote, this would require that the judge sit on 78% of the panels hearing issues of
first impression. Even in a smaller circuit like the Seventh, any one judge sits on less than
half this percentage of cases.
41. Calabresi is also a major figure in the law and economics movement, but his major
work in this genre came earlier in his career and was focused on the specific field of torts.
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Economics issues are important in some Supreme Court cases, so
Posner’s and Easterbrook’s expertise should count in their favor. But
these cases may not be the most important part of the docket, and a
President might be warranted in giving this factor relatively low
weight. Unreflective use of statistics obscures this question. More
generally, this analysis suggests the need for caution in using invocation figures as a measure of quality, because the figures may be
skewed by extraneous factors.
As this discussion of invocation statistics shows, it is important to
look beyond the raw data in assessing possible measures of judicial
quality. While this is most obvious with the outlier cases in the invocation statistics, it is also true of Choi and Gulati’s best indicator of
opinion quality—outside circuit citations.42
C. Citations
Citations are a more promising gauge of opinion quality. There
are, however, several possible measures of citation rates to consider.
We begin with Choi and Gulati’s “top twenty” citation measure.43 In
order to control for the effect of productivity on citation counts, Choi
and Gulati identified each judge’s top twenty opinions (measured by
citations) and then totaled the cites to those opinions. This measure
focuses on the impact of the judge’s strongest opinions rather than
looking at all opinions.
To get a sense of the distributions, it is helpful once again to start
with a table.
TABLE 2
CITATIONS TO TOP TWENTY OPINIONS44
OUTSIDE CITATIONS TO JUDGE’S TOP TWENTY OPINIONS

NUMBER OF JUDGES

0-100

2

101-200

24

201-300

39

301-400

19

401-500

9

501-600

2

601-700

2

701-800

1

42. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 49-50.
43. See id. at 54, 100-03 tbl.E.
44. Figures collated from id. at 100-03 tbl.E.
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There are a few things to notice about Table 2. First, unlike the frequency of invocations in Table 1, there are no big gaps in the distribution. While some entries are quite a bit higher than the mean, the
numbers climb smoothly to the peak. Second, the distribution is a bit
skewed.45 Third, it is roughly bell-shaped. These impressions are
supported by the formal statistics, which show some skew but a kurtosis of close to three (which would characterize a normal distribution).46
Why is this a (roughly) normal curve rather than a power-law distribution? Power laws indicate nonlinearity. For example, we would
expect a power law if a judge’s top twenty cases were in a feedback
loop, where having some of them cited frequently leads to more cites
for those cases or for the judge’s other top twenty cases. The absence
of such a feedback loop (or at least, of any evidence of such a loop)
suggests that among the most prominent cases, citations are not reinforcing but rather are based purely on the precedential value of
each opinion.
We get a different picture in Table 3, where we look at total citations, rather than just citations to a judge’s twenty most-cited opinions:
TABLE 3
TOTAL CITATIONS47
TOTAL OUTSIDE CIRCUIT CITATIONS

NUMBER OF JUDGES

101-300

34

301-500

34

501-700

22

701-900

4

901-1100

2

1101-1300

0

1301-1500

2

This does not look remotely like a bell-shaped distribution. Instead,
it starts with a large number of judges who get only a few citations
and tapers off, at first quickly and then more slowly. This is confirmed by the kurtosis, which is high (5.0)48 but not nearly so high as
the kurtosis for the invocation statistics (which was about ten times
45. If it were completely symmetrical, some judges would have to have a negative
number of citations to balance some of the above-average judges.
46. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 103.
47. Figures are collated from id. at 94-98 tbl.D.
48. Id. at 99.
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higher).49 This looks a great deal more like a power curve than a
normal curve. This should not be surprising—power curves are typical of citation counts in a variety of different fields.
The most notable feature of the power curve is that it tapers off
more slowly than a normal curve, so some people get much higher
scores than a normal curve would produce. If we assume that the distributions of ability and effort are closer to the normal curve, some
process must be boosting the top scores, magnifying differences of
ability and effort into large differences in outcomes.50
Comparing the last two tables suggests that something of the kind
is operating here. The quality of top twenty opinions, which presumably reflects the ability and effort of the judges fairly accurately,
follows a normal distribution. But the overall number of citations
does not, which indicates that for top judges, differences in citations
for non-top twenty opinions are disproportionate to differences in
ability and effort. In other words, there is a feedback loop for citations of less significant cases but not for citations of the most significant ones. We could conjecture that significant opinions are cited
purely on the basis of their quality, but that less significant opinions
are cited partly because the judge who wrote them is well known.
We might also consider the figures for law review citations to
judges in Table 4.
TABLE 4
LAW REVIEW CITATIONS51
NUMBER OF LAW REVIEW CITATIONS

NUMBER OF JUDGES

0-199

14

200-399

44

400-599

29

600-799

10

800-999

0

1000-1199

1

49. Id. at 107.
50. This feature applies to a broader set of distributions than power curves. Curves
having leptokurtosis have steeper peaks and fatter tails than the normal curve, but they
have small shoulders—in other words, most cases are either near the average or spread
out, with fewer intermediate cases than one would expect. Such distributions are said to be
characteristic of situations involving actors with bounded rationality. See BRYAN D. JONES,
POLITICS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE: BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND GOVERNANCE
164-84 (2001).
51. Figures collated from Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 94-99
tbl.D.
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With the possible exception of the top judge (once again, Posner) who
seems to be something of an outlier, this distribution does not show
strong signs of a superstar effect. Unlike invocations of judges in
other opinions, citations to judges in law reviews seem to be distributed among a broader group of judges, with little evidence of the superstar phenomenon. This is all the more interesting because opinions in casebooks show strong signs of the superstar phenomenon,52
so law professors appear to use different criteria in deciding which
cases to use in these two different settings.
Of the various citations figures, which is most relevant for considering potential Supreme Court appointments?53 The answer is probably the outside circuit citations to the judge’s top twenty opinions.
The most important thing a Justice does is write majority opinions.
Justices write fewer than twenty such opinions per year—more like
ten these days. The tournament covers three years, so the “top
twenty” count measures approximately the best seven opinions a
judge can write in a year, which is pretty close to the Supreme Court
workload. Citation figures for less significant cases tell less about
Supreme Court performance. When you get down to the thirtieth
least significant opinion a judge can write in a given year, some
judges may be much better than others, but this is irrelevant since
Supreme Court Justices never write that many majority opinions. In
other words, what we care about is the quality of the work the judge
does when he or she is really focused on a case and trying hard, not
the quality of his or her work on less significant cases.54
Another reason to favor the “top twenty” index is that it is more or
less a normal distribution, displaying few signs of the superstar phenomenon or other effects that might amplify or distort differences between judges. Invocations are the worst index by this standard, but
total citations also show more signs of nonlinear effects than top
twenty citations. Law review citations also have some appeal in
terms of the absence of apparent nonlinear distortions, provided we
are willing to view citation decisions by academics as unbiased and
accurate.
In the end, however, the choice of citation basis probably is not
critical if we are only looking for a rough measure of opinion quality.
52. See Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 30.
53. Choi and Gulati also collect statistics on citations by the Supreme Court. The
problem is that the numbers are small, ranging from 0 to 16, with almost all judges in a
small range between 4 and 8. Thus, the numbers could represent mostly random variation.
The only judges whose citation counts are listed as statistically significant (at the 95%
level) are Posner, Easterbrook, and a group of judges who received zero citations. It would
be interesting to examine the Posner/Easterbrook citations to get a better sense of when
they are cited. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 94-99 tbl.D.
54. The judge who tops the list based on this standard is Sandra Lynch. Id. at 100
tbl.E. Lynch replaced Stephen Breyer on the First Circuit.
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As Choi and Gulati point out, the correlation between citation indices
is very high after correcting for nonlinearities in some of the indices.55 But if we are looking to pick a winner in a tournament, the
choice of index may be more important.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Given what we can measure about past judicial performance, are
these measurements relevant in evaluating possible Supreme Court
nominees? Of the available measures, citation figures seem to be the
best indication of professional performance for judges. But of course,
they are only an imperfect measure. Indeed, among top judges, differences between citation rates might not even be statistically significant, so picking judges purely on the basis of numerical scores
might not be sensible.
There is another reason why the President might give only limited
weight to citation figures. I suggested earlier that the most relevant
citation figures are probably the number of citations to a judge’s
twenty most influential opinions. The reason is that this is comparable to the number of majority opinions for a Supreme Court Justice
in any given year. But the most heavily cited opinions by a given
judge may not be a random sample of different legal issues.
Based on a recent study of citations to Supreme Court opinions,56
it appears that the judicial opinions most heavily cited by other
judges may tend to involve procedural and other technical issues.57
For example, in the 1984 Term, the five opinions most cited by other
courts involved procedural issues (three cases), ERISA, and an erroneous jury instruction on municipal liability.58 In contrast, law reviews tend to favor citations to cases involving important social issues. Consequently, only a weak correlation exists between law review citations of Supreme Court cases and citations in law.59
This might suggest that the President ought to focus instead on
law review citations as better measuring performance in cases involving major social issues. The problem is that these citations arguably may be less reliable as an indicator of quality. Academics do
not have the same incentives that judges have to focus their citations
on the strongest opinions. They may equally well cite all of the opinions that bear on a particular topic, such as the legality of a specific
form of abortion, or they may choose to write about the opinions with

55. See id. at 74. They correct for nonlinearities such as the superstar effect by using
the logarithm of citation counts rather than the raw counts. Id. at 72.
56. See Farber, supra note 27.
57. See id. at 870.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 871, 873.
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which they most disagree. Moreover, the President might reasonably
fear that the political views of law professors would influence their
citation practices, which would make law review citations particularly suspect if the President does not happen to share that political
orientation. So the President might well find the “top twenty” citation rate to be a more reliable figure.
What this means is that most reliable citation figures probably
best measure how well a judge does with technical legal problems.
This is surely not an irrelevant consideration for a President. Presumably, it is in the country’s interest to have technical legal issues
decided correctly and with the most useful possible guidance to the
lower courts. But a President might reasonably be more concerned
with how well a judge will handle cases involving major social issues
such as abortion, affirmative action, or antiterrorism issues. Citation
counts may not give a good indication of the quality of those opinions.
The President might take either of two views about how cases involving major social issues relate to more technical legal cases. On
the one hand, he might believe that cases involving major social issues require only the same set of problem-solving and analytical
skills involved in more technical cases. Even so, he might still have
doubts about relying too heavily on the technical cases as gauges of
performance in “hot” cases. He may be concerned about whether a
judge who has very strong skills (as shown by citation levels) is able
to exclude ideological factors in more political cases. Thus, he would
want to look at those cases specifically to see if the judge is able to
solve really contentious legal issues through a dispassionate application of legal skills.
On the other hand, the President may believe that decisions in
“hot” cases involve something more than the application of technical
legal skills—that personal values or empathy or statesmanship are
especially important in these cases. Citation rates in cases with more
legalistic issues will only weakly reflect the presence of these values.60 Whichever view the President takes about the relationship between technical cases and “hot” cases, measuring the quality of opinions in the more technical cases would give him only limited guidance.
So far, I have been assuming that the President finds it irrelevant
how the judge will vote on particular legal issues but is only looking
for general indicators that a Justice will have the character and skill
to make good decisions in hard cases. But it is not clear that a con-

60. This may be part of the explanation for why individuals with federal circuit experience have not historically tended to rank as “great” Justices, as observed by Steven
Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1237 (2005).
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scientious President should take that view.61 There are two reasons
why the President might give weight to his view of how the Justice
will vote on key issues.
First, if the President has sufficient faith in his own views of the
constitutional merits of these issues, he might view a judge’s ability
to reach the “right answers” to be a critical test of judicial ability and
character. A judge who keeps getting the wrong answers must be doing something wrong, even if the President does not feel confident of
his ability to determine the exact nature of the deficiency.
Second, the President might view the outcomes in those cases as
having a social significance that outweighs any question of technical
legal correctness. He may believe that abortion is a form of mass
murder or, alternatively, that access to abortion is critical in order
for women to be equal citizens. It might be wrong for a judge to base
a decision entirely on her views about such social and moral considerations. But the President is not a judge and would seem to have
the discretion to nominate the judge whom he thinks will be, all
things considered, best for the nation’s welfare.
The point is simple: If the President simply wants to make the
best possible appointment, general measures of professional competence are not likely to be the exclusive factor in the decision. There
might, however, be some collateral reasons for excluding or at least
minimizing other factors.
To begin with, the President might believe that introducing other
factors undermines confidence in the courts by making them appear
politicized. This is certainly a concern, and one that has been frequently voiced. But nomination controversies do not seem to have
harmed the courts’ reputation to date, perhaps because few people
pay attention to the appointments process.
Alternatively, the President might believe that basing his selection on apparently objective measures will lead to a smoother appointments process, with less unseemly wrangling with Congress.
This would surely be desirable. But it is another question whether it
is realistic, given the country’s current political polarization. And in
any event, the tournament might not be successful in reducing partisanship. For instance, the putative winner of the tournament, Judge
Posner, has taken controversial positions which would be offensive to
important political factions. It seems unlikely that their opposition
would be silenced by the strength of his professional credentials.
Or perhaps the President might believe, like Choi and Gulati, that
using objective selection criteria would give lower court judges an in-

61. By conscientious, I mean a President who wants only to make the best appointment for the good of the country, excluding all partisan or personal considerations.
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centive for high performance. Here, there are two questions. First,
how strong would the incentive effect be? Only a few judges would be
serious contenders for victory in the tournament, and the incentive
effect would be strongest for them—but presumably the best performers are least in need of additional incentives. Second, is the gain
in incentives for lower court judges worth making an otherwise less
desirable Supreme Court appointment? Looking at the welfare of the
country as a whole, the President may think that small changes in
the performance of lower court judges are not valuable enough to be
worth the sacrifice.
V. CONCLUSION
Choi and Gulati propose a tournament, whereby promotion to the
Supreme Court would be based on objective measures of a circuit
judge’s performance. Although it is intriguing, such a tournament is
not, at least at present, a plausible option. Of the three traits that
Choi and Gulati seek to measure, one (productivity) is ambiguous as
an indicator of quality, and another (independence) is hard to measure and ideologically charged. Citation counts—and in particular,
Choi and Gulati’s “top twenty” counts—provide a better metric. This
measure of opinion quality is imperfect but seems relevant to the
President’s selection.
Yet, even if overall judicial performance could be perfectly measured, the best lower court judge might not be the best choice for the
President. Presidents are legitimately concerned with other factors,
including how the nominee might vote on current key issues and how
the nominee is likely to approach future national controversies. The
tournament idea puts too much weight on one dimension, albeit an
important one.
Although the tournament may not be “ready for prime time,” collecting and disseminating data on circuit judge performance could be
very useful. For example, a website could post the best available
measures of judicial quality.62 If it established a reputation for objectivity, such a website could be a valuable resource during Supreme
Court vacancies. It would be up to the relevant actors—Presidents,
Senators, press members, and the public—to decide on the relevance
of the information. More complete information could well improve the
quality of the debate.
Furthermore, such a website also could serve less dramatic, but
still significant, secondary functions. It would allow law students to
62. The model could be Brian Leiter’s influential website ranking law school faculties.
See Brian Leiter, Ranking of Law Faculty Quality 2003-04, EDUCATIONAL QUALITY RANKINGS
OF U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 2003-2004, at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/
(Mar. 25, 2003).
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make better-informed decisions about clerkships. Even without the
prize of a Supreme Court nomination, simply posting the measures
could also create some useful incentive effects. Finally, the website
would be a valuable resource for scholars.
It would be terrific to reform the acrimonious Supreme Court appointment process, but this may be too much for mere law professors
to achieve. If Choi and Gulati manage to have only a small incremental effect on judicial selection, that will be noteworthy. In the
meantime, the data they have already collected will provide scholars
with significant insights into patterns of influence among appellate
judges.

